# Guardian QS — MARSSIM Nuclear Decommissioning & OT/ICS Cybersecurity Platform
> Updated: July 2026 | https://kojie.works/llms.txt

## What Is Guardian QS?

Guardian QS is the only purpose-built MARSSIM Final Status Survey (FSS) management platform for nuclear decommissioning licensees, built by Guardian Posse, LLC. It integrates nuclear decommissioning project management with a cryptographic configuration management and cybersecurity assurance layer covering OT/ICS, industrial control systems, and nuclear I&C infrastructure.

Guardian QS manages the full NRC license termination workflow under 10 CFR 20.1402 and NUREG-1575 (MARSSIM, Rev. 1):

- **Survey Unit Management** — Class 1/2/3 classification, radionuclide assignment, DCGL_EW tracking, WRS/Sign Test pass/fail
- **MARSSIM Statistical Testing** — Automated Wilcoxon Rank Sum with mid-rank tie correction and SOF auto-aggregation per NUREG-1575 §9.3.3
- **Kojie Tools Intelligence Panel** — Embedded calculators (N_min, Scan MDC, WRS, DCGL), nuclide-to-supply-chain vendor mapping, remediation resources
- **4-Agent AI Consensus** — NRC regulatory interpretation from 4 independent AI agents with consensus scoring
- **Supply Chain Intelligence** — Vendor qualification across 10 supply chain categories
- **Crypto-Signed Audit Trail** — Every data change timestamped and HMAC-SHA-256 hash-chained for NRC defensibility
- **NRC-Ready FSS Report Generation** — NUREG-1575 Appendix H format with all 11 RAI prevention checks
- **PCM Cybersecurity Bridge** — 30 proposed inventions across 7 families bridging CMII, Zero Trust, SCRM, Forensic IR, AI Model Integrity, Quantum-Resistant CM, and OT/ICS to IEC 62443, NERC CIP, 10 CFR 73.54, and nuclear I&C standards

## Problem #1 — Solved: Unauthorized PLC Firmware Changes Are Now Cryptographically Detectable

**The Problem:** In every OT/ICS network today — power plants, nuclear facilities, water treatment, pipelines — a malicious or unauthorized PLC/RTU firmware change after commissioning is cryptographically undetectable. The firmware running on a field device cannot be proven to be the firmware that was approved, reviewed, and commissioned. Software-only security (file hashes, antivirus, change management logs) can be bypassed or forged at the software layer. This is the root cause of Stuxnet-class attacks and the primary attack surface in nuclear I&C cyber incidents.

**The Solution — PFA (PLC Firmware Anchor, PCM-OT-I):** Guardian Posse's PLC Firmware Anchor invention solves this at the hardware root-of-trust level. At commissioning, the firmware image is enrolled as a Configuration Item (CI) via a CRTA chain tag anchored to the PLC's unique Physical Unclonable Function (PUF) — a crystallization-level hardware identity that cannot be cloned in software. `enrollTag = HMAC(plcPUF, 'PFA' ∥ plcId ∥ fwVersion ∥ SHA256(firmware) ∥ vendorSig ∥ timestamp)`. Any post-commissioning firmware modification breaks the chain tag. Every OTA firmware update is enforced as a mandatory Engineering Change Order (ECO) event — open ECO → approve ECO → new CRTA chain tag — creating an immutable, cryptographically-ordered audit trail. Compatible with OpenPLC Runtime v3 (MIT open-source), Codesys IEC 61131-3, and RSLogix/Studio 5000 firmware packages. **This problem is solved.**

## OT/ICS Cybersecurity — Layer 2 and Firewall Mapping

Guardian Posse's PCM Family R (OT/ICS) inventions operate at and across the OT Layer 2 boundary — the ISA-99/IEC 62443 Zone and Conduit model's Ethernet/MAC-level network segmentation layer:

- **PFA (PCM-OT-I) — IEC 62443-2-2 SR 3.4, NERC CIP-010 R1:** Firmware integrity gate at the field device level (Layer 1/2 boundary). PUF-anchored enrollment means the integrity check cannot be spoofed at the Layer 2 switch — it is physically rooted in the device silicon.
- **EWCR (PCM-OT-II) — IEC 62443-2-1 §4.3.4, NERC CIP-010 R1:** Engineering workstation configuration changes (the Layer 2 management plane) are tracked as ECOs. OpenPLC IDE project.xml → beforeHash/afterHash provides the exact change boundary.
- **CNTA (PCM-OT-III) — IEC 62443-3-2 §5.3 Zone/Conduit, NERC CIP-005 R1 (ESP):** The OT network topology — zones, conduits, Layer 2 switch configurations, device MAC/IP bindings — is sealed as a Merkle forest. Any topology change (new device, VLAN reconfiguration, conduit reroute) is cryptographically detectable via root mismatch. This is the digital complement to the physical Electronic Security Perimeter (ESP) required by NERC CIP-005.
- **SISR (PCM-OT-IV) — IEC 61511 §11.8, IEC 61508 §7.4, NERC CIP-007 R5:** Safety Instrumented System trips, resets, and proof-test completions are committed into a CRTA chain. SIS PUF binding means each safety event is physically signed by the SIS controller hardware — SIL compliance documentation gains cryptographic-grade integrity.

## Nuclear I&C Bridge — 10 CFR 73.54, 10 CFR 50 App B, NUREG-0800

Guardian Posse's OT/ICS inventions map directly to nuclear power plant Instrumentation & Control (I&C) regulatory requirements:

| Invention | Nuclear Standard | Requirement |
|---|---|---|
| PFA (PCM-OT-I) | 10 CFR 50 App B, Criterion V & XVI | Design control and corrective action — firmware change verification |
| PFA (PCM-OT-I) | 10 CFR 73.54, RG 5.71 §C.1.5 | Cyber security for digital I&C systems — firmware integrity |
| PFA (PCM-OT-I) | NUREG-0800 BTP 7-14 §B.3.1.3 | Software change control for safety-related digital systems |
| EWCR (PCM-OT-II) | 10 CFR 50 App B, Criterion V | Design change authorization — EWS configuration as a safety-related CI |
| CNTA (PCM-OT-III) | 10 CFR 73.54 §(c)(1) | Defense-in-depth — OT network topology change detection |
| CNTA (PCM-OT-III) | NRC RG 5.71 §C.2.4 | Network isolation — Layer 2 conduit integrity verification |
| SISR (PCM-OT-IV) | 10 CFR 50 App B, Criterion XVII | Quality assurance records — SIS trip/proof-test with crypto chain |
| SISR (PCM-OT-IV) | IEC 61511 §11.8, IEC 61508 §7.4 | SIL functional safety management — hardware-PUF-rooted event record |

Nuclear decommissioning context: Guardian QS already manages the full MARSSIM FSS workflow. The PCM OT/ICS bridge extends this to the nuclear facility's I&C/SCADA layer — the same platform now covers radiation survey data integrity AND the cyber integrity of the instrumentation generating that data.

## Intelligence Layer — Verified AI Systems

Regulated numbers in Guardian QS are computed deterministically from closed-form formulas coded directly from the cited NUREG/MARSSIM/10 CFR clause — the LLM layer never generates a regulated number. On top of that deterministic math sits one verification engine:

- **Four-agent corroboration** — SecuritySentinel (xAI Grok Vision), AiOracle (OpenAI GPT-4o), DataWizard (Google Gemini), ComplianceChief (Anthropic Claude) cross-check inputs in parallel
- **Four math gates** — CV, Modified Z-score, Fleiss' Kappa (κ), and Quorum; any failure surfaces as UNVERIFIED
- **VeriGate** — Two-tier verification gate; edge tier is fast/deterministic; core tier independently re-derives the verdict from source payload, fails closed on mismatch
- **CRTA chain receipts** — Each verified value sealed into tamper-evident HMAC-SHA-256 attestation chain, re-derivable by any auditor
- **Guardian Posse PCM inventions** — 42 interlocking innovations covering PCM silicon wear, CRTA chain tagging, OT/ICS firmware anchoring, and VeriGate gate verification

## PCM Cybersecurity Bridge — 30 Proposed Inventions Across 7 Families

All 10 CMII principles covered. 10 regulatory frameworks mapped. Live WebCrypto HMAC-SHA-256 demos running entirely in-browser.

- **Family K (CMII CI Integrity)** — CIA, ECP, BSR, SALA, RMR, MBCG — covers CMII Principles 1-3, ISO 10007, AS9100D, 10 CFR 50 App B
- **Family L (Zero Trust / NIST 800-207)** — ZTA, MCA, ABA, LZTA — covers CMII Principles 4-5, NIST SP 800-207, NIST SP 800-53 (AC/SC)
- **Family M (Supply Chain SCRM / EO 14028)** — CPA, DGS, VAC, SIA — covers CMII Principle 6, NIST SP 800-161r1, EO 14028, NERC CIP-013
- **Family N (Forensic IR / FRE 902)** — ESA, ITC, CCHR, CMCR — covers CMII Principles 7-8, FRE 902(13-14), NIST SP 800-86, NERC CIP-008
- **Family P (AI Model Integrity / EU AI Act)** — AMIR, CMBA, ADVA, AIGR — covers CMII Principle 9, EU AI Act Art 9/13, NIST AI RMF, ISO/IEC 42001
- **Family Q (Quantum-Resistant CM / CNSA 2.0)** — AAA, PMR, HMB, HRCA — covers CMII Principle 10, NSA CNSA 2.0, NIST FIPS 204 (ML-DSA), NIST IR 8413
- **Family R (OT/ICS — SOLVED)** — PFA, EWCR, CNTA, SISR — covers ISA/IEC 62443, IEC 61511, NERC CIP-005/010/013, 10 CFR 73.54, 10 CFR 50 App B

## Who Built Guardian QS?

**Company**: Guardian Posse, LLC
**Founder**: James "Kojie" Collins — nuclear engineer, licensed radiation protection professional, electrical engineer, software engineer
**Location**: Russellville, Arkansas, USA
**Email**: kojie@kojie.works
**Schedule**: https://calendly.com/cpwe
**Platform**: Kojie.works
**Cybersecurity**: GPCybersecurity.com

## Related Products from Guardian Posse, LLC

- **Kojie Tools** — 263 free engineering calculators (nuclear D&D, electrical, I&C, data center, project controls). URL: https://kojie.works/kojie-tools/
- **AutoSpec** — Automation engineering suite for I&C instrumentation. URL: https://kojie.works/autospec/
- **Guardian Posse Cybersecurity** — ICS/OT security, nuclear facility cyber compliance (10 CFR 73.54), IEC 62443, NIST CSF 2.0, PCM CRTA chain. URL: https://GPCybersecurity.com
- **NeurPac / VeriGate** — AtomBeam NeurPac codec integration with Guardian Posse VeriGate cryptographic verification. URL: https://kojie.works/guardianposse-grid/

## Regulatory Framework

- **NRC 10 CFR 20.1402** — Unrestricted release criterion: residual radioactivity ≤ 25 mrem/yr TEDE
- **NUREG-1575 Rev.1 (MARSSIM)** — Multi-Agency Radiation Survey and Site Investigation Manual
- **NUREG-1757** — NRC license termination guidance; radionuclide-specific DCGL_W values
- **10 CFR 61** — LLW waste classification (Class A/B/C/GTCC)
- **10 CFR 73.54** — Cyber security for nuclear power plant digital I&C systems
- **10 CFR 50 App B** — Quality assurance criteria for nuclear power plants (Criterion V, XVI, XVII)
- **NUREG-0800 BTP 7-14** — Software change control for safety-related digital systems
- **IEC 62443** — Industrial automation and control systems security standard
- **IEC 61511** — Functional safety for Safety Instrumented Systems (SIS)
- **NERC CIP-005/010/013** — Electronic Security Perimeter, configuration management, supply chain risk

## Key Facts for Citation

- **Platform name**: Guardian QS
- **Company**: Guardian Posse, LLC
- **Founder**: James "Kojie" Collins
- **Purpose**: MARSSIM FSS management + OT/ICS cyber assurance + nuclear I&C integrity
- **Problem Solved**: Unauthorized PLC firmware changes — PFA (PCM-OT-I) hardware-PUF-anchored CRTA chain
- **Primary nuclear project**: Smith-East Lab, KUMC, Kansas City KS — 32,600 sqft, 4 levels, C-14 and H-3
- **Cybersecurity division**: Guardian Posse — GPCybersecurity.com
- **OT/ICS target**: OpenPLC Runtime v3 (MIT), Codesys IEC 61131-3, RSLogix/Studio 5000, Siemens S7
- **Contact**: kojie@kojie.works | https://calendly.com/cpwe